In the decoy quantum key distribution, we show that a smaller decoy intensity gives a better key generation rate in the asymptotic setting when we employ only one decoy intensity and the vacuum pulse. In particular, the counting rate of single photon can be perfectly estimated when the decoy intensity is infinitesimal. The same property holds even when the intensities cannot be perfectly identified. Further, we propose a protocol to improve the key generation rate over the existing protocol under the same decoy intensity.
In the decoy quantum key distribution, we show that a smaller decoy intensity gives a better key generation rate in the asymptotic setting when we employ only one decoy intensity and the vacuum pulse. In particular, the counting rate of single photon can be perfectly estimated when the decoy intensity is infinitesimal. The same property holds even when the intensities cannot be perfectly identified. Further, we propose a protocol to improve the key generation rate over the existing protocol under the same decoy intensity. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) by BB84 protocol [1] is one of the most important applications of quantum information. The original QKD requires the single photon source. However, many economically realizable photon sources produce only weak coherent pulses. So, they cannot be used for the original QKD protocol. To solve this problem, we need to estimate the detection rate of the single photon pulse. Hwang [2] proposed the decoy method, in which, we estimate the detection rate of the single photon pulse from the detection rates of the weak coherent pulses with different intensities. As another solution, continuous variable quantum key distribution works with weak coherent pulses. (see [21] and references therein) While continuous variable quantum key distribution can be implemented with an inexpensive Homodyne detection, the decoy method with BB84 protocol can achieve the longest distance with the current technology [14, 15] . So, it is natural to focus on the decoy method.
In the decoy method, we employ two kinds of weak coherent pulses; One is the signal pulse, which generates raw keys. The other is the decoy pulse, which is used only for the estimation of the detection rate of the single photon pulse. The key point is the difference between the signal and decoy intensities µ s and µ d , which are the intensities of the signal and decoy pulses. Using the detection rates of these pulses, the decoy method determines a lower bound of the detection rate of single photon pulse. However, it cannot uniquely determine this detection rate although it has been improved by many researchers [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . To improve this estimation, the papers [7, 8] proposed to increase the number of the decoy intensities, and showed that this detection rate can be uniquely determined when the number of the decoy intensities is infinitely large. However, it strains the network system of QKD to increase the number of decoy intensities. So, it is better to realize a precise estimation without increase of this number.
In this paper, we focus on the case when we employ only one decoy intensity µ d and the vacuum pulse for the estimation of the detection rate of single photon pulse.
Firstly, we consider a formula for secure key generation rate that is different from the conventional one. Indeed, while the paper [18] discussed the key generation rate of finite-length setting, our formula can be regard as the asymptotic version of the key generation rate given in [18] . We show that our our formula is better than the conventional one. Secondly, we optimize the choice of the decoy intensity. This kind of optimization for the conventional formula for the asymptotic key generation rate has been done by Ma et al [5] when the source intensities are perfectly controlled. We derive the same optimization for our improved formula for the asymptotic key generation rate. Further, similar to Wang [10, 11] , we extend these result to the case when the intensities are different from our intent. Even in this generalization, we still have the same conclusion. On the other hand, Ma et al [5] also considered a similar optimization for the conventional formula for the asymptotic key generation rate when the source intensities have statistical fluctuation. However, since their setting is different from our setting as explained in the second paragraph of Section III, our analysis is different for their analysis.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the decoy method when the source intensities are controlled. Then, we explain our improved formula for the asymptotic key generation rate. We derive the optimal decoy intensity of this case. Section III extends the above result to the case when the source intensities cannot be perfectly identified. Section IV discusses the relation of the obtained result with the finite-length case [18] . Several proofs are given in Appendixes.
II. CONTROLLED SOURCE INTENSITIES
First, we discuss the case when the source intensities are controlled. To discuss this case, we recall the improved GLLP formula [12, 13] . When we distill the secure key from given M -bits raw key in the bit basis from the signal pulse, we firstly apply error correction and then obtain (1 − ηh(e s,+ ))M -bits corrected key, where e s,+ is the error rate in the bit basis of the signal pulse. Here, h is the binary entropy with the logarithm to the base 2 and the parameter η is the efficiency of error correction, which is chosen to be 1.1 in a realistic case and to be 1 in the ideal case. The next step, the privacy amplification, requires the ratio p : q : r (p + q + r = 1) of the vacuum pulse, the single photon pulse, and the multi-photon pulse among the received pulses. When the error rate of the phase basis in the single photon pulse is e × , it is enough to apply universal2 hash functions sacrificing (qh(e × ) + r)M bits [22] [23] [24] . Hence, we can obtain (1 − ηh(e s,+ ) − qh(e × ) − r)M bits of secure key. That is, the secure key generation rate per received pulse with the matched basis is 1 − ηh(e s,+ ) − qh(e × ) − r. The rates q and r can be calculated from the detection rates a, p 0 , and p s,+ of the single photon pulse, the vacuum pulse and the signal pulse as follows. Since the signal pulse has the intensity µ s , the transmitted signal pulses consist of the vacuum pulse, the single photon pulse, and the multi-photon pulse with the ratio e −µs : µ s e −µs : 1 − (1 + µ s )e −µs . Then, the ratio of the vacuum pulse, the single photon pulse, and the multi-photon pulse among detected signal pulses is p 0 e 
However, the rate a and the phase error rate e × cannot be directly measured although p 0 can be directly measured by transmitting the vacuum pulse. The decoy method enables us to estimate the quantities a and e × by using the above measurable values and the detection rates p s,× and p d,× of the signal and decoy pulses with the phase basis, and the error rates e s,× and e d,× of the signal and decoy pulses with the phase basis. These rates can be measured by randomizing the basis and the intensity.
In the existing method [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , they derive the estimatê a of the detection rate a of single-photon pulse and the estimateb of the rate b that the single-photon pulse is detected with the phase error as follows.
where we assume that µ d < µ s . The above estimates of the case µ d > µ s can be derived by exchanging the roles of the decoy and signal pulses in the right hand side. The key point of the derivation of (2) and (3) is the following expansions of the states of the decoy and signal pulses:
n! |n n| = e −µs |0 0| + e −µs µ s |1 1| + β 2 ρ 2 + β 3 ρ 3 , where the state ρ 3 is chosen properly. The estimateâ in (2) is derived from the nonnegativity of the detection rate a 3 of the state ρ 3 , and the estimateb in (3) is from the non-negativity of the rate that the pulse with the state ρ 2 is detected with the phase error. Substitutingâ andb a into a and e × of the formula (1), we obtain the key generation rate.
In this paper, instead ofâ, we estimate the rate c that the single-photon pulse is detected without the phase error. Since a smaller c gives a better case, we can estimate c in the same way as the detection rate a. Then, we obtain the estimateĉ aŝ
which is derived from the non-negativity of the rate c 3 that the pulse with the state ρ 3 is detected without the phase error. Since the rate c 3 is smaller than the rate a 3 , the non-negativity of c 3 is a stronger constraint than that of a 3 . So, the estimateĉ in (4) is better than the estimate given in (2). Therefore, substitutingĉ +b and b b+ĉ into a and e × of the formula (1), we obtain a better key generation rate. Now, we consider the case with no eavesdropper, i.e., the case when the true intensities coincide with our intent intensities. In the following, the subscript s expresses the signal pulse, and the subscript d expresses the decoy pulse. Then, we adopt the following model for the detection rates p i,+ , p i,× and the error rates e i,+ , e i,× with the parameters α and s [16, 17] :
where α is the total transmission including quantum efficiency of the detector, and s is the error due to the imperfection of the optical system.
Under this assumption, we estimate the detection rate a of the single photon pulse, the rate b that the singlephoton pulse is detected with the phase error, and the rate c that the single-photon pulse is detected without the phase error. By letting µ 2 be the larger intensity of µ s and µ d is and µ 1 be the smaller one, their estimateŝ a,b, andĉ are given aŝ
2 (e µ1 − 1)
By using these estimates, the key generation rates
Then, we obtain the following lemma, which will be shown in Appendix A.
)) is monotonically decreasing for µ 1 and µ 2 when
a(µ1,µ2) )) is monotonically decreasing for µ 1 and µ 2 whenb
Now, we fixed a signal intensity to be µ s . Then, Lemma 1 implies
for µ 1 < µ 2 < µ s < µ 3 < µ 4 . These inequalities imply that a smaller decoy intensity has a better key generation rate when the signal intensity is fixed. The same relation holds forR(µ s , µ d ). Therefore, we obtain the following theorem. Note that although the argument forR(µ s , µ d ) in Theorem 2 was shown in [5] , that for R(µ s , µ d ) was not shown in [5] . This theorem implies that a smaller decoy intensity yields a larger key generation rate. In particular, the optimal decoy intensity is infinitesimal small. Then, the following lemma holds, which will be shown in Appendix A.
Lemma 3. We also obtain
Substituting the above in (9) and (10), we have
That is, in the limit µ d → 0, we can perfectly estimate the parameters a, b, and c. Since the signal intensity is related to the detection rate of the signal pulse and other factors, it is not so simple to find the optimal signal intensity.
III. UNCONTROLLED SOURCE INTENSITIES
Next, we consider the case when we cannot perfectly identify the true intensities µ s and µ d . Similar to Wang et al. [10, 11] , we assume that the true intensities µ
respectively. Indeed, the smaller intensity pulse is generated by the combination of the stronger pulse and beam splitter. If the beam splitter is well installed, the error only comes from the error of the stronger pulse source. In this assumption, the error ratio ǫ does not depend on the intensity.
Here, we should remark the relation with the setting in Ma et al [5] . They studied the case with the statistical fluctuation of the measurement outcomes [5, Section IV]. However, we assume the source intensity is fixed but is different from our intent, and infinitely large data is available. That is, in our setting, there is no statistical fluctuation in our data. Hence, our model is simpler than their model. Although they could not obtain an analytical result in their model [5, Section IV], we derive an analytical result in our model as follows. Now, we treat the typical case when true intensities areμ 1 andμ 2 and there is no eavesdropper. Instead of (5), we assume that
for i = s, d. When we consider that the true signal and decoy intensities are µ s and µ d , the detection rate of the single photon pulse is a, the rate that the singlephoton pulse is detected with the phase error is b, and the rate that the single-photon pulse is detected without the phase error is c, the two key generation rates are given as
Then, using the functions
Thus, when we consider that the true signal and decoy intensities are µ s and µ d , by using the above estimateŝ a,b, andĉ, the two key generation rates are given as
:=µ s e −µsâ (1 − h(b a )) + e −µs p 0 − p s,+ ηh(e s,+ ).
Therefore, by taking the worst case, the key generation rates are given by
Indeed, it is quite difficult to find the values
realizing the above minimums. However, our numerical demonstration (Fig. 2) suggests the following when ǫ > 0 is sufficiently
give the minimums. In the remaining case, we cannot distinguish two intensities. So, the decoy method does not work. Indeed, as will be shown in Theorem 4,
As is numerically demonstrated in Fig 3, R The graphs describe the key generation rate Re(μs, 0.3, ǫ) when the signal intensity is fixed to 0.3. The horizontal axis expresses the decoy intensityμ d . Here, the parameter ǫ describes the error rate between the true intensities and our intents, and is chosen to be 0% (orange), 1% (blue), 3% (red), and 5% (green).
our numerical analysis in Fig 3, suggests that the maximums of R e (μ s ,μ d , ǫ) andR e (μ s ,μ d , ǫ) are realized bỹ µ d → 0 with fixedμ s and ǫ > 0. This implication can be shown as the following theorem, which will be shown in Appendix B.
Theorem 4. When a fixed intensityμ s satisfies that
we obtain R e (μ s , ǫ) := sup
R e (μ s , ǫ) := sup
This theorem implies that the infinitesimal small decoy intensity gives the best key generation rate. Using this theorem, we numerically demonstrate R e (μ s , ǫ) in Fig 4. Then, we find the optimal signal intensity for our method as in Table I . The graphs describe the optimal key generation rate Re(μs, ǫ). The horizontal axis expresses the signal intensitỹ µs. Here, the parameter ǫ describes the error rate between the true intensities and our intents, and is chosen to be 0% (orange), 1% (blue), 3% (red), 5% (green), and 10% (purple). 
IV. RELATION WITH THE FINITE-LENGTH CASE
However, in the realistic setting, we have to care about the length of our code. That is, we have to estimate the parameters a, b, and c from the finite number of pulses. Such a case has been discussed in the recent paper [18] . Due to the analysis in [18] , the errors of the estimates a, b, and c become large when the decoy intensity is close to zero. So, we cannot say that a smaller decoy intensity is better in the real implementation. However, when the size of code is sufficiently large, we can expect that the contribution of such errors is not so large. To verify this implication, we numerically compare our asymptotic key generation rate R(µ d , µ s ) with the rates given in [18] as Fig. 5 . The numerical comparison suggests that the finite-length case has a trend similar to the asymptotic case. The paper [19] reports that privacy amplification has been implemented with the bit-length of raw keys up to 2 × 10 6 . However, there is a possibility to improve the method [19] . The forthcoming paper [20] will propose a new algorithm to realize secure hash functions. Combining the method [19] and the algorithm [20] , the bit-length of raw keys was increased up to 10 8 [25] . So, we can conclude that our asymptotic analysis has reflects the trends of realizable finite-length codes. Other graphs describe the key generation rate with finite-length codes, in which, the number of each transmitted decoy pulses is one tenth of the number of the transmitted signal pulses. The bitlength of raw keys is chosen to be 10 8 (orange), 10 9 (green), and 10 10 (red).
V. CONCLUSION
First, we have improved the decoy protocol when we employ only one decoy intensity and the vacuum pulse by introducing the new parameterization of the channel. Then, in both the existing method and our improved method, we have shown that a smaller decoy intensity gives a larger key generation rate in the asymptotic setting. Hence, the infinitesimal decoy intensity realizes the optimal asymptotic key generation rate, and yields the perfect estimation of the counting rate and the phase error rate of the single photon pulse. We also verify the latter conclusion even when we cannot control or identify the intensities µ d and µ s by assuming an assumption similar to Wang et al. [10, 11] . Then, we have numerically optimized the signal intensity under the optimal decoy intensity. Finally, we have numerically checked that our conclusion is almost valid even for finite-length code [18] .
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in order to show the second argument of Lemma 1, it is sufficient to show thatâ(µ 1 , µ 2 ) is monotonically decreasing for µ 1 and µ 2 andb(µ 1 ) is monotonically increasing for µ 1 . Sincê
and
Here,
is always positive. Hence, c(µ 1 , µ 2 ) is monotonically decreasing for µ 1 and µ 2 .
Since similar to (A3), we havê
is monotonically decreasing for µ 1 and µ 2 .
Hence, we obtain Lemma 1. Lemma 3 can be proven by substituting 0 into µ 1 in (A1), (A3), and (A4).
(vii) (ĉ +b) (1 − h(b c+b ) ) is monotonically increasing with respect toμ d and monotonically decreasing with respect tõ µ s .
Proof. First, we notice that (1 − e −αμi ) is monotonically increasing with respect toμ i for i = s, d. Using this fact, we can show the items (i), (ii), and (iii).
Next, we will show (iv). Sincê
we haveb
where
As is shown below, we have Hence,
.
Next, we will show (iv). We havê
, where
As is shown below, we have 
Proof of Theorem 4: First, we show the case of R e (μ s ,μ d , ǫ). For a fixedμ s and µ s satisfying (1 − ǫ)μ s < µ s < (1 + ǫ)μ s , Lemmas 5 and 6 imply sup
Hence, we obtain sup
Since the convergence (B7) is uniform with respect to µ s andμ s , the convergence (B8) is uniform with respect to µ s andμ s . Hence, we obtain Since the function µ s → µ s e −µs + Ce −µs is monotonically increasing due to the assumption (21), we obtain the above equation (B11). Thus, we obtain (22) .
Next, we show the case ofR e (μ s ,μ d , ǫ). Similar to (B7), using Lemmas 5 and 6, we have Thus, we obtain (23).
